

half of the nineteenth century, and ruled it to the practical exclusion of any wider conception of a common human welfare. They were plausible and dangerously unsound working ideas. They represented nothing fundamental and inalterable in human nature, and they failed to meet the new needs of world controls and world security that the mechanical revolution was every day making more imperative.

They were accepted because people in general had neither the sweeping views that a study of world history can give, nor had they any longer the comprehensive charity of a world religion. Their danger to all the routines of ordinary life was not realized until it was too late.

§ 7

The Great Exhibition of 1851.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, this world of new powers and old ideas, this fermenting new wine in the old bottles of diplomacy, broke out through the flimsy restraints of the Treaty of Vienna into a series of wars. But by an ironical accident the new system of disturbances was preceded by a peace festival in London, the Great Exhibition of 1851. This exhibition deserves a paragraph or so.

The moving spirit in this exhibition was Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the nephew of Leopold I, the German king who had been placed upon the Belgian throne in 1831, and who was also the maternal uncle of the young Queen Victoria of England. She had become queen in 1837 at the age of eighteen. The two young cousins—they were of the same age—had married in 1840 under their uncle's auspices, and Prince Albert was known to the British as the "Prince Consort." He was a young man of sound intelligence and exceptional education, and he seems to have been greatly shocked by the mental stagnation into which England had sunken.

Oxford and Cambridge, those once starry centres, were still recovering but slowly from the intellectual ebb of the later eighteenth century. At neither university did the annual matriculations number more than four hundred. The examinations were for the most part mere *viva voce* ceremonies. Except for two colleges in London (the University of London) and one in Durham, this was all the education on a university footing that England had to offer.

It was very largely the initiative of this scandalized young German who had married the British queen which produced

the University Commission of 1850, and it was with a view to waking up England further that he promoted the first International Exhibition, which was to afford some opportunity for a comparison of the artistic and industrial products of the various European nations.

The project was bitterly opposed. In the House of Commons it was prophesied that England would be overrun by foreign rogues and revolutionaries who would corrupt the morals of the people and destroy all faith and loyalty in the country.

The exhibition was held in Hyde Park in a great building of glass and iron—which afterwards was re-erected as the Crystal Palace. Financially it was a great success. It made many English people realize for the first time that theirs was not the only industrial country in the world, and that commercial prosperity was not a divinely appointed British monopoly. There was the clearest evidence of a Europe recovering steadily from the devastation of the Napoleonic wars, and rapidly overtaking the British lead in trade and manufacture. It was followed directly by the organization of a Science and Art Department (1853), to recover, if possible, the educational lee-way that Britain had lost.

§ 8

The Career of Napoleon III.


The Great Exhibition of 1851 released a considerable amount of international talk and sentiment. It had already found expression in the work of such young poets as Tennyson, who had glanced down the vista of the future.

“Till the war-drums throb’d no longer, and
the battle-flags were furl’d,
In the Parliament of man, the Federation
of the world.”

The vision was premature. Beneath the apparent peace of that brief interval of liberalism and superficial enlightenment the seeds of a new crop of international conflicts were germinating. France was nominally a liberal republic. But her president was a Bonaparte, the nephew of the First Napoleon, he was a person of great cunning and enterprise, and he was destined to bring upon France and Europe even greater disasters than those his uncle had achieved half a century before.

The French republic, which had replaced the Orleans monarchy in 1848, had had a brief and troubled career. From

the outset it was embarrassed by crude socialistic proposals which produced much economic disorganization and even more business anxiety. The new Napoleon Bonaparte, posing as a liberal "safe" man, who would restore confidence and stabilize affairs, was able to secure his election as President in the October of that year. He took an oath as President to be faithful to



the democratic republic, and to regard as enemies all who attempted to change the form of government. In two years' time (December, 1852) he was Emperor of the French.

At first he was regarded with considerable suspicion by Queen Victoria, or rather by Baron Stockmar, the friend and servant of King Leopold of Belgium, and the keeper of the international conscience of the British queen and her consort. All this group of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha people had a reasonable and generous enthusiasm for the unity and well-being of many

—upon liberal lines—and they were disposed to be alarmed at this Bonapartist revival. Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister, was, on the other hand, friendly with the usurper from the outset; he offended the queen by sending amiable dispatches to the French President without submitting them for her examination and so giving her sufficient time to consult Stockmar upon them, and he was obliged to resign. But subsequently the British Court veered round to a more cordial attitude to the new adventurer.

The opening years of his reign promised a liberal monarchy rather than a Napoleonic career—a government of “cheap bread, great public works, and holidays,”¹ and he expressed himself warmly in favour of the idea of nationalism, which was naturally a very acceptable idea to any liberal German intelligence. There had been a brief all-German parliament at Frankfort in 1848, which was overthrown in 1849 by the Prussian monarchy.

Before 1848 all the great European Courts of the Vienna settlement had been kept in a kind of alliance by the fear of a second and more universal democratic revolution. After the revolutionary failures of 1848 and the restoration of monarchy in France, this fear was lifted, and they were free to resume the scheming and counter-scheming of the days before 1789—with the vastly more powerful armies and fleets the first Napoleonic phase had given them. The game of Great Powers was resumed with zest, after an interval of sixty years, and it continued until it produced the catastrophe of 1914.

For a time the new Napoleon went warily. It was the Tsar of Russia, Nicholas I, who made the first move towards war. He resumed the traditional thrust of Peter the Great towards Constantinople. Nicholas invented the phrase of the “sick man of Europe” for the Sultan, and, finding an excuse in the misgovernment of the Christian population of the Turkish empire, he occupied the Danubian principalities in 1853.

It was a real international retrocession. European diplomats found themselves with a “question” of quite the eighteenth-century pattern. The designs of Russia were understood to clash with the designs of France in Syria, and to threaten the Mediterranean route to India of Great Britain, and the outcome was an alliance of France and England to bolster up Turkey, and a war, the Crimean War, which ended in the repulse of Russia. One might have thought that the restraint of Russia was rather the business of Austria and Germany but the passion

¹ Albert Thomas, in the *Encyclopædia Brit*

of the foreign offices of France and England for burning their fingers in Russian affairs has always been very difficult to control. And the new Napoleon saw in this war an opportunity of cementing his insecure friendship with Britain and the British Court, which had so far held aloof from him.

The next phase of interest in this revival of the Great Power drama was the exploitation, by the Emperor Napoleon III and



the king of the small kingdom of Sardinia in North Italy, of the inconveniences and miseries of the divided state of Italy, and particularly of the Austrian rule in the north. The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel, made an old-time bargain for Napoleon's help in return for the provinces of Nice and Savoy. France was to have these, and Sardinia was to be compensated in Italy. The war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other broke out in 1859, and was over in a few weeks. The Austrians were badly beaten at Mentana and

Solferino. Then, being threatened by Prussia on the Rhine, Napoleon made peace, leaving Sardinia the richer for Lombardy.

The next move in the game of Victor Emmanuel and of his chief minister Cavour was an insurrectionary movement in Sicily led by the great Italian patriot Garibaldi. Sicily and Naples were liberated, and all Italy, except only Rome (which remained loyal to the Pope) and Venetia (which was held by the Austrians), fell to the king of Sardinia. A general Italian parliament met at Turin in 1861, and Victor Emmanuel became the first king of Italy.

But now the interest in this game of European diplomacy shifted to Germany. Already the common sense of the natural political map had asserted itself. In 1848 all Germany, including, of course, German Austria, was for a time united under the Frankfort parliament. But that sort of union was particularly offensive to all the German courts and foreign offices; they did not want a Germany united by the will of its people, they wanted Germany united by regal and diplomatic action—as Italy was being united.

In 1848 the German parliament had insisted that the largely German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, which had been in the German Bund, must belong to Germany. It had ordered the Prussian army to occupy them, and the king of Prussia had refused to take his orders from the German parliament, and so had precipitated the downfall of that body. Now the King of Denmark, Christian IX, for no conceivable motive except the natural folly of kings, embarked upon a campaign of annoyance against the Germans in these two duchies. Prussian affairs were then very much in the hands of a minister of the seventeenth-century type, von Bismarck (count in 1865, prince in 1871), and he saw brilliant opportunities in this trouble. He became the champion of the German nationality in these duchies—it must be remembered that the king of Prussia had refused to undertake this rôle for democratic Germany in 1848—and he persuaded Austria to side with Prussia in a military intervention.

Denmark had no chance against these Great Powers; she was easily beaten and obliged to relinquish the duchies.

Then Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria for the possession of these two small states. So he brought about a needless and fratricidal war of Germans for the greater glory of Prussia and the ascendancy of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany. He consolidated Germany under the Prussian Hohenzollerns. German writers of a romantic turn of mind represent Bismarck as a great statesman planning the unity of

Germany; but, indeed, he was doing nothing of the kind. The unity of Germany was a reality in 1848. It was and is in the nature of things. The Prussian monarchy was simply delaying the inevitable in order to seem to achieve it in Prussian fashion. That is why, when at last Germany was unified, instead of bearing the likeness of a modern civilized people, it presented itself to the world with the face of this archaic Bismarck, with a fierce moustache, huge jack-boots, a spiked helmet, and a sword.

In this war between Prussia and Austria, Prussia had for an ally Italy, while most of the smaller German states, who dreaded the schemes of Prussia, fought on the side of Austria. The reader will naturally want to know why Napoleon III did not grasp this admirable occasion for statecraft and come into the war to his own advantage. All the rules of the Great Power game required that he should. He was allowing a dangerous rival to France to arise in Europe in the shape of Prussia. He should have done something to prevent this. But Napoleon, unhappily for himself, had got his fingers in a trap on the other side of the Atlantic, and was in no position just then to intervene.

He had been sorely tempted by America. The discord between the interests of the southern and northern states in the North American union, due to the economic differences based on slavery, had at last led to open civil war. In our next section we will deal with this civil war more fully; here we will only say that it lasted four years, and ended at last in a reunited United States. All the elements of reaction in Europe rejoiced during the four years of republican dissension; the British aristocracy openly sided with the confederate states, and the British Government permitted several privateers, and particularly the *Alabama*, to be launched in England to attack the federal shipping.

Napoleon III was even more rash in his assumption that, after all, the new world had fallen before the old. Hitherto the United States had forbidden European interference upon the continent of America. This was, so to speak, a fixed rule of American policy. The sure shield of this Monroe doctrine, it seemed to Napoleon, was now thrust aside for good, the Great Powers might meddle again in America, and the blessings of adventurous monarchy be restored there.

A pretext for interference was found in certain liberties taken with the property of foreigners by the Mexican president. A joint expedition of French, British, and Spanish troops occupied Vera Cruz, but Napoleon's projects were too bold for his allies,

and they withdrew when it became clear that he contemplated nothing less than the establishment of a Mexican empire. This he did, after much stiff fighting, making the Archduke Maximilian of Austria Emperor of Mexico in 1864. The French forces, however, remained in effectual possession of the country, and a crowd of French speculators poured into Mexico to exploit its mines and resources.

But in April, 1865, the civil war in the United States was brought to an end, and the little group of eager Europeans in possession of Mexico found themselves faced by the victorious United States government in a thoroughly grim mood, with a large, dangerous-looking army in hand. The French imperialists were bluntly given the alternative of war with the United States or clearing out of America. In effect, this was an instruction to go. This was the entanglement which prevented Napoleon III from interference between Prussia and Austria in 1866, and this was the reason why Bismarck precipitated his struggle with Austria.

While Prussia was fighting Austria, Napoleon III was trying to escape with dignity from the briars of Mexico. He invented a shabby quarrel upon financial grounds with Maximilian and withdrew the French troops. Then, by all the rules of kingship, Maximilian should have abdicated. But, instead, he made a fight for his empire; he was defeated by his recalcitrant subjects, caught, and shot as a public nuisance in 1867. So the peace of President Monroe was restored to the new world.

But while Napoleon was busy with his American misadventure, Prussia and Italy were snatching victory over the Austrians (1866). Italy, it is true, was badly beaten at Custoza and in the naval battle of Lissa, but the Austrian army was so crushed by the Prussian at the battle of Sadowa that Austria made an abject surrender. Italy gained the province of Venetia, so making one more step towards unity—only Rome and Trieste and a few small towns on the north and north-western frontiers remained outside the kingdom—and Prussia became the head of a North German Confederation, from which Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Austria were excluded.

This victory of Prussia, this supersession of Austria as even the nominal head of things German, this restoration of the predominance of the kingdom of Frederick the Great, brought Prussia and France face to face. A great rivalry had become clear, a rivalry that was to produce at last the greatest and most desolating war in all history. It was only a question of time before France and Prussia clashed. Each med, but

Prussia had better schoolmasters and a higher standard of obedience and efficiency than France.

The war almost came in 1867, when, so soon as he was free from Mexico, Napoleon sought to pick a quarrel with Prussia over Luxembourg. It came in 1870 quite on eighteenth-century grounds, with a dispute about the candidates for the vacant throne of Spain. Napoleon had some theory in his mind that Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and the other states outside the North German Confederation would side with him against Prussia. He probably thought this would happen because he wanted it to happen. But since 1848 the Germans, so far as foreign meddling was concerned, had been in spirit a united people; Bismarck had merely imposed the Hohenzollern monarchy, with pomp, ceremony, and bloodshed, upon accomplished facts. All Germany sided with Prussia against France.

Early in August, 1870, the united German forces invaded France. In numbers, discipline, equipment, and leading they proved better than the French. The debacle of France was swift and complete. After the battles of Wörth and Gravelotte, one French army under Bazaine was forced into Metz and surrounded there, and on September 1st a second, with which was Napoleon, was defeated and obliged to capitulate at Sedan. Napoleon became a prisoner. Paris found herself bare to the invader. For a second time the promises of Napoleonism had failed France disastrously.

On September 4th France declared herself a republic again and, thus regenerated, prepared to fight for existence against triumphant Prussianism. For, though it was a united Germany that had overcome French imperialism, it had Prussia in the saddle. The army in Metz capitulated in October; Paris, after a siege and bombardment, surrendered in January, 1871, and France sued for peace.

With pomp and ceremony, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, amidst a great array of military uniforms, the King of Prussia was declared German Emperor, and Bismarck and the sword



Bismarck

of the Hohenzollerns claimed the credit for that German unity which a common language and literature had long since assured.

The peace of Frankfort which followed was a Hohenzollern peace. Bismarck had availed himself of the national feeling of Germany to secure the aid of the South German states, but he had no grasp of the essential forces that had given victory to him and to his royal master. The power that had driven Prussia to victory was the power of the natural political map of Europe insisting upon the unity of the German-speaking peoples. In the east, Germany was already sinning against that natural map by her administration of Posen and other Polish districts. Now greedy for territory, and particularly for iron mines, she annexed a considerable area of French-speaking Lorraine, including Metz, and Alsace, which, in spite of its German speech, was largely French in sympathy.

Inevitably there was a clash between German rulers and French subjects in these annexed provinces; inevitably the wrongs and bitterness of the subjugated France of Lorraine echoed in Paris and kept alive the passionate resentment of the French.

How at last that flared up in a great Revanche we shall tell later. . . .

Napoleon III hid his diminished head in England, and died there a year or so after his collapse.

So ended the second Bonapartist regime in France.

§ 9

Lincoln and the Civil War in America.

It is a relief to turn from the disastrous exploits of this Bonapartist adventurer in France, and the temporary triumph of the Hohenzollern family over the popular movement in Germany, to an altogether greater and more significant figure, the figure of Abraham Lincoln, about which the incidents of the great war of secession in America may very conveniently be grouped.

The opening half of the nineteenth century, which had been an age of reaction and recovery in Europe, was in America a period of extravagant growth. The new means of communication, the steamboat and the railway and presently the electric telegraph, came just in time to carry forward the movement of the population across the continent. But for these mechanical aids, the United States even to-day might not reach

westward beyond the Rocky Mountains and an entirely different people might be in possession of the western coast.

It is still very imperfectly grasped by politicians how dependent are the areas enclosed by governmental and administrative boundaries upon the means of communication available and the character of the country in relation to transport. Given roads and writing, open valleys tend to become consolidated under one government. Mountainous barriers separated not only peoples but rulers; the Roman empire was an empire of high-road and wheel, and its divisions and separations and fall were due to the impossibility of maintaining swift communications between part and part. The Western Europe that emerged from the Napoleonic storm was divided into national states that were perhaps as large as they could become without loss of solidarity with high-road horse traction as their swiftest linking method.

Had the people of the United States spread over the American continent with only horse traction, rough road, and letter-writing to keep them together, it seems inevitable that differences in local economic conditions would have developed different social types, that wide separation would have fostered differences of dialect and effaced sympathy, that the inconvenience of attending Congress at Washington would have increased with every advance of the frontier westward, until at last the States would have fallen apart into a loose league of practically independent and divergent nations. Wars, for mineral wealth, for access to the sea, and so forth, would have followed, and America would have become another Europe.

But the river steamboat, the railway, and the telegraph arrived in time to prevent this separation, and the United States became the first of a new type of modern transport state, altogether larger, more powerful, and more conscious of its unity than any state the world had ever seen before. For the tendency now in America is not to diverge but assimilate, and citizens from various parts of the States grow not more but less unlike each other in speech and thought and habit. The United States is really not comparable to a European power such as France or Italy. It is a new and bigger type of political organization.

Empires there have been before in the world comparable in area and population to the United States, but they were merely accumulations of diverse tribute-paying peoples united only by a government. The unity of the United States is inherent. It is a community of outlook of over one hundred million men.

The railways which intensified the conflicts and congestions of Europe, the inventions that diminished the striking distance of the European armies and gave them ever greater destructive power, so that now there seems no choice for Western Europe between voluntary unification or forcible unification under some one predominant power, or chaos and destruction, confirmed the free unity of republican America. To Europe steam brought congestion, to America opportunity.

But on the way to this present greatness and security the American people passed through one phase of dire conflict. The river steamboats, the railways, the telegraph, and their associate facilities, did not come soon enough to avert the deepening conflict of interests and ideas between the southern slave-holding states and the free industrial north. The railways and steamboats at first did but bring into sharper conflict an already established difference. There was a profound difference in spirit between the two sections of the United States, and the increasing unification due to the new means of transport made the question whether the southern spirit or the northern should prevail an ever more urgent one. There was little possibility of compromise. The northern spirit was free and individualistic; the southern made for great estates and a conscious gentility ruling over a dusky subject multitude. The sympathies of British liberalism and radicalism were for the north; the sympathies of the British landlords and the British ruling class were for the south.

Every territory that was organized into a state, every new incorporation into the fast-growing American system, became a field of conflict between the two ideas, whether it should become a state of free citizens or whether the estate system should prevail. The issue crept slowly to predominance in American affairs after the establishment of Missouri (1821) and Arkansas (1836) as slave-holding states. From 1833 an American anti-slavery society was not merely resisting the extension of the institution, but agitating the whole country for its complete abolition.⁴ The issue flamed up into conflict over the admission of Texas to the union. Texas had originally been a part of the republic of Mexico, but it was largely colonized by Americans from the slave-holding states, and it seceded from Mexico and established its independence in 1836. A vigorous agitation for the annexation of Texas followed, and Texas was annexed in 1844 and admitted as a state in 1845. Under the Mexican law slavery had been forbidden in Texas, but now the south claimed Texas for slavery—and got it.

Moreover, a war with Mexico arising out of the Texas annexation had added New Mexico and other areas to the United States, and in these regions also slavery was permitted and a Fugitive Slave Bill increased the efficiency of the methods of catching and returning slaves who had fled to free states. But, meanwhile, the development of ocean navigation was bringing a growing swarm of immigrants from Europe to swell the spreading population of the northern states, and raising of Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Oregon, all northern farm lands, to state level gave the anti-slavery north the possibility of predominance both in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The cotton-growing south, irritated by the increasing threat of the Abolitionist movement, and fearing this predominance in Congress, began to talk of secession from the Union. Southerners began to dream of annexations to the south of them in Mexico and the West Indies, and of a great slave state, detached from the north and reaching from the Mason and Dixon line to Panama.

Kansas became the region for the final decision. The slavery issue plunged the territory of Kansas into what was practically a civil war between settlers from the free and immigrants from the slave states, a war that continued until 1857 and ended in the victory of the anti-slavery settlers. But until 1861 Kansas was not raised to statehood. The extension of slavery was the chief issue before the country in the presidential election of 1860, and the return of Abraham Lincoln as an anti-extension President decided the south to split the union.

South Carolina passed an "ordinance of secession," and prepared for war. Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas joined her early in 1861, and a convention met at Montgomery in Alabama, elected Jefferson Davis president of the "Confederated States" of America, and adopted a constitution similar to that of the United States but specifically upholding "the institution of negro slavery."

Such was the political situation with which Abraham Lincoln was called to deal as president of the Union. He was, it chanced, a man entirely typical of the new people that had grown up after the War of Independence. His people were quite common folk; his father could not read or write until after his marriage, and his mother, it is said, was an illegitimate child. She was a woman of exceptional intellect and character.

His early years had been spent as a drifting particle in the general westward flow of the population. He was born in

Kentucky (1809), was taken to Indiana as a boy, and later on to Illinois. Life was rough in the backwoods of Indiana in those days; the house was a mere log cabin in the wilderness, and his schooling was poor and casual. But his mother taught him to read early, and he became a voracious reader.

At seventeen he was a big athletic youth, a great wrestler and runner. At nineteen he went down river to New Orleans as a hired hand on a flat boat. He worked for a time as clerk in a store, served as a volunteer in an Indian war, went into business as a storekeeper with a drunken partner, and contracted debts that he did not fully pay off for fifteen years. Finally, when he was about twenty-four, he got a job as deputy to the county surveyor of Sangamon County, which, he said, "kept body and soul together."

All this time he was reading hard. His earlier books—those early books that make the mind—seem to have been few but good; he read all he could get; he knew his Shakespeare and Burns well, the life of Washington, a history of the United States, and so forth. He had the instinct for expression, and from his boyhood he wrote as well as studied, producing verse, essays, and the like. Much of this was coarse, homely stuff. Politics soon attracted him. In 1834, when he was still only five-and-twenty, he was elected member of the House of Representatives for the state of Illinois; he read for the bar, and was admitted in 1836. For a time he worked rather at law than politics.

But the great question before the people of the United States insisted upon the attention of every able man. This big, capable, self-educated man, so typically a man of the middle west, could not fail to be profoundly stirred by the steady development of the issues of slavery and secession. In Illinois particularly the question flamed because the great leader in Congress of the party for the extension of slavery was Senator Douglas of Illinois. There was a personal rivalry between the two; they had both courted the lady who became Mrs. Lincoln. Douglas was a man of great ability and prestige, and for some years Lincoln fought against him by speech and pamphlet, first in Illinois and then throughout the eastern states, rising steadily to the position of his most formidable and finally victorious antagonist. Their culminating struggle was the presidential campaign of 1860, and on the 4th of March, 1861, Lincoln was inaugurated president, with the southern states already in active secession and committing acts of war.

The first proceeding of the secessionists was the seizure of

all Federal forts and stores within their boundaries. These Federal posts were built on territory belonging to the states in which they stood, and these states claimed the right to "resume" their property. The garrison of Fort Sumter at Charlestown resisted, and the war began with the bombardment of this fort on the 12th of April, 1861. America at that time had only a very small regular army; it remained loyal to the president, and these opening operations of the Confederacy were conducted by state levies. President Lincoln at once called for 75,000 men, and Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia immediately went over to the Confederacy, which had now hoisted its own flag, the "Stars and Bars," against the Stars and Stripes.

So began the civil war in America. It was fought by improvised armies that grew steadily from a few score thousands to hundreds of thousands—until at last the Federal forces exceeded a million men; it was fought over a vast area between New Mexico and the eastern sea. Washington and Richmond were the chief objectives. It is beyond our scope here to tell of the mounting energy of that epic struggle that rolled to and fro across the hills and woods of Tennessee and Virginia and down the Mississippi. There was a terrible waste and killing of men. Thrust was followed by counter-thrust; hope gave way to despondency, and returned and was again disappointed. Sometimes Washington seemed within the Confederate grasp; again the Federal armies were driving towards Richmond.

The Confederates, outnumbered and far poorer in resources, fought under a general of supreme ability, General Lee. The generalship of the Union was far inferior. For long Lincoln clung to General McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," a pedantic, dilatory, and disappointing commander. Generals were dismissed, new generals appointed, until at last, under Sherman and Grant, came victory over the ragged and depleted south. In October, 1864, a Federal army under Sherman broke through the Confederate left and marched down from Tennessee through Georgia to the coast, right across the Confederate country, and then turned up through the Carolinas, coming in upon the rear of the Confederate armies. Meanwhile Grant held Lee before Richmond until Sherman closed on him.

On April 2nd, 1865, the Confederate troops evacuated Richmond; on April 9th, Lee and his army surrendered at Appomattox Court House, and within a month all the remaining secessionist armies had laid down their arms and the Confederacy was at an end.

But this four years' struggle had meant an enormous physical and moral strain for the people of the United States. In many states, in Maryland and Kentucky for example, opinion upon the war was acutely divided. The principle of state autonomy was very dear to many minds, and the north seemed in effect to be forcing abolition upon the south. Many men were against slavery, but also against interference with the free power of each individual state over its own people. In the border states brothers and cousins, even fathers and sons, would take opposite sides and find themselves in antagonistic armies. The north felt its cause a righteous one, but for great numbers of people it was not a full-bodied and unchallenged righteousness.

But for Lincoln there was no doubt. He was a clear-minded man in the midst of such confusion. He stood for the Union; he stood for the great peace of America. He was opposed to slavery, but slavery he held to be a secondary issue. His primary purpose was that the United States should not be torn into two contrasted and jarring fragments. So through the long four years of struggle he stood out an inflexible conviction, a steadfast will.

When in the opening stages of the war Congress and the Federal generals embarked upon a precipitate emancipation, Lincoln opposed and mitigated their enthusiasm. He was for emancipation by stages and with compensation. It was only in January, 1865, that the situation had ripened to a point when Congress could propose to abolish slavery for ever by a constitutional amendment; and the war was already over before this amendment was ratified by the state.

As the war dragged on through 1862 and 1863, the first passions and enthusiasms waned, and America learnt all the phases of war weariness and war disgust. Conscription replaced volunteering, and changed the spirit of the fighting both in the south and the north. The war became a prolonged, dismal, fratricidal struggle.

July, 1863, saw New York rioting against the drafts, and the Democratic party in the north sought to win the presidential election on the plea that the war was a failure and should be discontinued. This would, of course, have meant a practical victory for the south. There were organized conspiracies to defeat the draft. The gaunt, tall man at the White House found himself with defeatists, traitors, dismissed generals, tortuous party politicians and a doubting and fatigued people behind him, and uninspired generals and depressed troops before him;

and his chief consolation must have been that Jefferson Davis at Richmond could be in little better case.

The English government had misbehaved, and permitted the Confederate agents in England to launch and man three swift privateer ships—the *Alabama* is the best-remembered of them—which were chasing United States shipping from the seas. The French army in Mexico was trampling the Monroe doctrine in the dirt. Came subtle proposals from Richmond to drop the war, leave the issues of the war for subsequent discussion, and turn, Federal and Confederate in alliance, upon the French in Mexico. But Lincoln would not listen to such proposals unless the supremacy of the Union was maintained. The Americans might do such things as one people but not as two.

He held the United States together through long weary months of reverses and ineffective effort, through black phases of division and failing courage; and there is no record that he ever faltered in his purpose. There were times when there was nothing to be done, when he sat in White House silent and motionless, a grim monument of resolve; times when he relaxed his mind by jesting and broad anecdotes. He was full of sardonic humour, but very tender with the pain of others. When some enemies of Grant came to tell him that general drank, he asked for the brand of his whisky—"for the others." He was himself a man very abstemious in his habits, capable of either an immense industry or an immense patience.

At last in the early months of 1865 it was plain that victory was coming, and he set himself with all his force to make surrender easy and the treatment of the vanquished the beginning of a reconciliation. Still his watchword was "Union." He was soon in conflict with the extremists of his own side who wished for a vindictive peace.

He saw the Union triumphant. He entered Richmond the day after its surrender and heard of Lee's capitulation. He returned to Washington, and on April 11th made his last public address. His theme was reconciliation and the reconstruction of loyal government in the defeated states. On the evening of April 15th he went to Ford's Theatre in Washington, and as he sat looking at the stage he was shot in the back of the head and killed instantly by an actor named Booth, who had some sort of grievance against him, and who had crept into the box unobserved.

If the work of healing was impaired and if the United States had more trouble and bitterness in the years following the war than there was need for, it was because Lincoln was dead. But

his work was done, and the Union was saved, and saved for good. At the beginning of the war there was no railway to the Pacific coast; now the railways spread like a swiftly growing plant until they had clutched and held and woven all the vast territories of the United States into one now indissoluble mental and material unity.

From that time the consolidation of the United States has gone on steadfastly. Within half a century its population had passed the hundred million mark. And there is no sign that growth and development have yet reached any limitation. This Titanic democracy, without king or elaborate foreign policy, is, we repeat, a new thing in the world's experience. It is not a "Great Power" in the sense in which that phrase is used in Europe. It is something more modern in its nature, and greater, and with a greater destiny.

§ 10

The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin.

A fresh upthrust of, what we have here called, the natural map against the diplomatic arrangements of the treaty of Vienna began in 1875, when the Christian races in the Balkans, and particularly the Bulgarians, became restless and insurgent. The Turks adopted violent repressive measures, and embarked upon massacres of the Bulgarians on an enormous scale.

Thereupon Russia intervened (1877), and after a year of costly warfare obliged the Turks to sign the treaty of San Stefano, which was, on the whole, a sensible treaty, breaking up the artificial Turkish Empire, and to a large extent establishing the natural map. But it had become the tradition of British policy to thwart "the designs of Russia"—heaven knows why!—whenever Russia appeared to have a design, and the British foreign office, under the premiership of Lord Beaconsfield, intervened with a threat of war if a considerable restoration of the Turks' facilities for exaction, persecution and massacre was not made. For a time war seemed very probable. The British music-halls, those lamps to British foreign policy, were lit with patriotic fire, and the London errand-boy going his rounds was inspired to chant, with the simple dignity of a great people conscious of its high destinies, a song declaring that:

"We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo,¹ if we do,
We got the ships, we got the men, we got the
munn-aye too" . . .

¹ Hence "Jingo" for any rabid patriot.

and so on to a climax:

"The Russ'ns shall not 'ave Con-*stan-te-no* . . . ple."

In consequence of this British opposition, a conference was assembled in 1878 at Berlin to revise the treaty of San Stefano, chiefly in the interests of the Turkish and Austrian monarchies; the British acquired the island of Cyprus, to which they had no



sort of right whatever, and which has never been of the slightest use to them; and Lord Beaconsfield returned triumphantly from the Berlin Conference, with what the British were given to understand at the time was "Peace with Honour."

This treaty of Berlin was the second main factor, the peace of Frankfort being the first, in bringing about the great war of 1914-18.

§ 11

The (Second) Scramble for Overseas Empire.

We have suggested that in the political history of Europe between 1848 and 1878 the mechanical revolution was not yet producing any very revolutionary changes. The post-revolutionary Great Powers were still going on within boundaries of practically the same size and with much the same formalities as they had done in pre-revolutionary times. But where the increased speed and certainty of transport and telegraphic communications were already producing very considerable changes of condition and method was in the overseas enterprises of Britain and the other European powers, and in the reaction of Asia and Africa to Europe.

The end of the eighteenth century was a period of disrupting empires and disillusioned expansionists. The long and tedious journey between Britain and Spain and their colonies in America prevented any really free coming and going between the home land and the daughter lands, and so the colonies separated into new and distinct communities, with distinctive ideas and interests and even modes of speech. As they grew, they strained more and more at the feeble and uncertain link of shipping that joined them. Weak trading-posts in the wilderness, like those of France in Canada, or trading establishments in great alien communities, like those of Britain in India, might well cling for bare existence to the nation which gave them support and a reason for their existence. That much and no more seemed to many thinkers in the early part of the nineteenth century to be the limit set to overseas rule.

In 1820 the sketchy great European "empires" outside of Europe, that had figured so bravely in the maps of the middle eighteenth century, had shrunk to very small dimensions. Only the Russian sprawled as large as ever across Asia. It sprawled much larger in the imaginations of many Europeans than in reality, because of their habit of studying the geography of the world upon Mercator's projection, which enormously exaggerated the size of Siberia.

The British Empire in 1815 consisted of the thinly populated coastal river and lake regions of Canada, and a great hinterland of wilderness in which the only settlements as yet were the fur-trading stations of the Hudson Bay Company; about a third of the Indian peninsula, under the rule of the East India Company; the coast districts of the Cape of Good Hope, inhabited by blacks and rebellious-spirited Dutch settlers; a few