

their power. The Japanese collapse was so swift that there were not sufficient Dutch forces to hand to make their resumption of authority automatic when they returned. They were faced by native governments, strongest in Java, which had come to power under the Japanese shadow and had no intention of abandoning it. There was confused conflict until the United Nations, in January 1948, secured a "cease fire"; this was broken at the end of the year when the Dutch, claiming that it had been ignored by the Indonesians, tried to put them down by a "police action". This was only partially successful; in 1949 a Federal Union was formed under United Nations' auspices, with the Dutch Queen at its head. But no sooner had the Indonesians secured internal control than they broke the connexion with Holland, centralized the government in Java, and passed to terms of open hostility with their old masters over the ownership of the savage district of Western New Guinea.

The most complete contrast with this story was that of the dissolution of the British Empire. This was a dissolution by consent—indeed, by the initiative of the controlling power, which in 1945 was in command of immense and victorious forces (hideously weak though their economic basis was, this was not generally realized outside the island). Where the Dutch left behind them only ill will, the British secured forgiveness in general for their past imperialism, and the freed nations in most cases decided voluntarily to remain within the Commonwealth. This curious and improbable result was secured by a Government beset by the most serious difficulties, on other planes as well. The British Labour Party in 1945, by the gain of 200 parliamentary seats, had secured unquestioned power with a mandate not so much for the ending of the empire as for the establishment of a Socialist community in which the massive unemployment and the wretched poverty of the interwar period should be unknown. They found themselves in charge of a nation whose financial condition was such that grinding poverty looked like being the lot of everyone. The immediate financial effect of the ending of Lease-Lend has been mentioned: but this was but one part of their difficulties. The essence of the problem was that there were roughly fifty million people on an island which from its own resources could support half that number at most. Only the income from past investments abroad had for the last half century made it possible for the British to live (even then there were some millions in poverty); during the war, these investments had had to be sold. What few remained, such as the Argentine Railways, mostly had to be disposed of for mere food.

The British ate the Argentine railroads in the form of frozen beef. It was calculated in 1946 that, if she was to survive, Britain must increase her exports to foreign countries (which were raising tariffs and imposing quotas) not by a hundred per cent, but 125 per cent or even more. The endeavour looked crazy; it could only be based upon a degree of self-sacrifice that it seemed improbable would be accepted. Moreover, the country was deeply in debt. During the war the gigantic expenses of keeping the Germans and Italians out of Egypt, and the Japanese out of India had been charged as a matter of book-keeping against the British only; the only thing that could be done, in the government's possibly quixotic opinion, was to fund these vast claims and pay them off to the Egyptians and Indians piece by piece as was possible. Natural conditions—floods and unusually severe winters, especially in 1947—aggravated the problem, and for years this victorious people had to keep themselves to the austere régime. Clothes were rationed, fuel and petrol were rationed. Even bread was rationed in 1946, and as late as 1951 the weekly meat ration was 8d worth. The American loan, which should have helped them greatly, was in part deprived of its value by a steep rise in American prices after V.J. day. An attempt was made to meet one of its conditions in 1947 by making the pound convertible; almost at once there was a run on it and the attempt had to be abandoned, leaving conditions worse than before. The government's desperate manœuvring was further circumscribed by the decision to set up a semi-socialist society. The voters who had put it into office must be given evidence of an intention to make the new world they had been promised, even though the industries to be taken over were run down and required heavy new investment, which would have to mean more austerity still. Consequently, the coal-mines were nationalized. The nationalization of electricity and gas was completed. The Bank of England was nationalized. The railways and canals were nationalized. Road transport was nationalized. The iron and steel trades were nationalized. A national health service was instituted (not free, but paid for by an overall insurance contribution taken from nearly every citizen) to make sure that no one was left untreated or unhelped in sickness or accident. These large social changes were carried through democratically and without invasion of civil liberties; they satisfied, for the moment, the workers who had voted for them, and in the opinion of their proposers they provided an alternative to the Communist programme, which by now found scarcely any supporters in the island. Time was to show that there were more difficulties in

the programme of nationalization than had been suspected; but for the moment the mixture of Socialism and Capitalism appeared politically a success.

But what happened outside Britain was more important than what happened inside. The announcement of the British intention to free India, in particular, was received with scepticism, only partly dissolved in February 1947 by the announcement that British troops would leave India the next year, whether or not the Moslems and Hindus could resolve their quarrels; and that the King's cousin, Lord Mountbatten, would be sent out as last Viceroy to supervise the granting of freedom. The Hindus and Moslems remained irreconcilable, and in August 1947 the latter were awarded the separate state of "Pakistan" that they demanded, of which the Eastern half, in Bengal, was separated from the Western by the whole breadth of India. The two states, India and Pakistan, separated bloodily; massacres marked the division of the Punjab, and almost open war the dispute over Kashmir, a Moslem state whose Hindu ruler handed it to India. Both states decided to remain within the Commonwealth, but both lost their most eminent leaders almost at once. Jinnah, the creator of Pakistan, died in September 1948; Gandhi was murdered by a Hindu fanatic in January 1948.

Burma sought, and received, complete independence in January 1948. Ceylon became a Dominion within the Commonwealth a month later. Southern Ireland left the Commonwealth in 1949. First steps towards self-government were rapidly taken in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Tanganyika, the Sudan, Central Africa and elsewhere in Africa. The most dramatically successful was in the Gold Coast in 1951 where the new Premier (still called only "Leader of Government Business"), Kwame Nkrumah, had to be brought from a prison cell to be installed; the least successful was in Kenya where in 1952 there broke out a recrudescence of African savagery taking the name of Mau-Mau; the most questionable was in Central Africa where the negroes were suspicious of the federation in 1953 of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, into which South African ideas of racial discrimination were infiltrating; a danger the greater because on the defeat of Smuts in 1948 the narrowest Boer Nationalists had taken control in the Union of South Africa.

Not all British retreats ended successfully. The troops left Egypt according to promise and without conditions, but received no thanks. Resentment was felt because they stayed in control of the Suez Canal, and the British government continued to

refuse to accept Egyptian authority over the Sudan. In Palestine affairs were even worse; the British attempted to restrict Jewish immigration in an endeavour to please the Arabs, only to find themselves engaged in a guerrilla war with the Jews for whose immigration they had originally been responsible. After some bloody episodes, once again the British announced that they would leave, and formally returned to the United Nations the mandate that they had in the first place received from the League of Nations. The United Nations in November 1947 produced a plan for the division of the country which might have done very well if either side had had any peaceful intentions. But both Jews and Arabs had other ideas; no sooner had the last British soldier left in May 1948 than full war broke out. A short but fierce struggle followed in which the five Arab powers (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Irak) failed to drive the Jews out, and left them in occupation of a larger area than the United Nations had delimited. An uneasy and often-broken armistice, not a peace, followed the war.

The story of the French empire was less straightforward. The constitution of the "French Union" as drawn up after the war, offered a partnership between France and her dependencies which before the war would have been attractive enough. But whatever charms it might have had were dispelled by the fact that it was never effectively applied. For a short while the war-time leader of the Free French, General de Gaulle, headed a coalition government of all parties; but in 1946 this broke up. The General left, the Communist party turned to destructive opposition, and a series of shortlived cabinets provided a parody of government. No long term initiative could be sustained. Admirable proposals for European Union were initiated by the French, especially M. Robert Schumann. Meetings of a European Assembly were held regularly in Strasbourg, and there was even a Council of Ministers. But when in 1954 an attempt was made to proceed to more permanent and effective organization, it was the French themselves who drew back and prevented it. The sole substantial result of their initiative was (in the period up till 1954) the construction in 1951 of a European Coal and Steel Community, providing for controlled united trade and production within France, Western Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.

Indecision from the same cause paralysed French colonial policy. Complete disaster was only reached in this period in Indo-China, where after complex negotiations with the Annamite ("Viet-nam") nationalists open war broke out between their

forces, led by the Communist Ho Chih Minh, and the French. The French had initial successes, and endeavoured to set up an amenable Viet-nam state under the once-dethroned Emperor Bao Dai, but at Dien-bien-phu (in 1954) were so severely defeated, with Chinese Communist aid, that it was clear the colony, as a colony, was lost. It was clear too to all but the ever-changing Prime Ministers of France that similar nationalist pressure was building up in her vast African domains. But in the absence of firm central government official routine is in power, which means in effect the prevention of any change. A revolt in Madagascar was put down, the Sultan of Morocco was deported in 1953 and a puppet put in his place, and the plans for democratic government in Algeria were frustrated by the French there, whom no Parisian government was strong enough to oppose.

§ 3

The Expansion of Communism.

The eviction of the French from northern Annam was due, it has been said, largely to "Communist aid". A new factor had entered into history—Communist expansion. It is impossible to continue this narrative without explaining what Communism had become. The earlier chapters of this book have described the rise of Socialist thought and Socialist parties. Communism was the lineal descendant of these; it might reasonably be expected to share their characteristics. But it did not, or at least it shared very few of them. Communism, in the days of Stalin, was no longer "the revolution" in the old-fashioned Socialist phrase; it was much more like a counter-revolution. There was nothing new in this. Revolutions had before now ended in counter-revolution, but the change had been accepted and open; the names that men used and the phrases for their policies had altered after the counter-revolution, and corresponded to changed facts. Charles II did not act as if he were a leader of the Long Parliament; Louis XVIII did not pose as a Jacobin. They were endeavouring to be as like as changed circumstances would permit to Charles I and Louis XVI, and they never pretended otherwise. But the Russian counter-revolution was a gradual process with no march by a General Monk, no Thermidors or Waterloos to mark dramatically the change. Throughout Stalin's rise to power, and even afterwards, the old slogans were used, the old institutions (even if powerless) preserved, and Stalin, himself, the man for whose

advantage the revolution was first arrested and then turned back, used throughout all his murderous career the same language as Lenin. His verbose works, which his followers had to master and admire, are derivative, and void of any original thought. They are commentaries on the texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin; when Stalin wished to say anything of importance, or to mark down a new tendency or group for destruction, he folded his message inside a mat of orthodox jargon; sometimes only initiates could recognize and extract the instruction. Words such as "peace", "democracy", "mass movements", "freedom of labour", "popular rule" and even "socialism" did not now have their original meaning (they might have none, or the opposite) but they were always used, and their use had great propaganda value. For outside Russia, particularly in the poor countries of the Far East, they were taken to have their original meaning, and gained hundreds of thousands of supporters who might well have been disquieted if they had been transported to their presumed Utopia in Stalin's Russia. There was, indeed, a danger in this ambivalence. A church which is corrupted at its centre can possibly be found out by the hardworking and simple missionaries who toil in the outlands, and their resentment can be dangerous. Nine times out of ten, in such a case, learned reasoning by a worldly bishop, or a judicious use of force by an inquisitor will suffice; the heretic, or the doubter, will be convinced, or silenced, or will decide it is best to labour quietly in his parish. But there may always be a tenth case. However the Kremlin thought that it had disposed of its possible Luther; Trotsky had been followed by an assassin and his brains beaten out in Mexico.

The sacred books, so to speak, of the original Communists were the works of Marx and Engels, as commented on by Lenin. Now Marx and Engels had been men of fiercely libertarian sentiments. Not only were they personally intolerant of the least control of their own thoughts and actions, they detested any governmental oppression; the words "jailer" and "police spy" were among their worst insults. They despised particularly a ruler who covered up his tyrannies, as did Napoleon III, with egalitarian or Socialist phrases. Lenin also, their successor to whom Stalin appealed equally frequently, had as his aim a state so free that it approximated to anarchism, and tried, or believed he tried, to bring it about. In his *State and Revolution*, published in 1917, he described a society in which all officials would be subject to recall by the citizens if they showed incompetence or autocratic tendencies, in which wages would be equal and the

methods of administration would be so simplified and divided that "every cook" could take part in it, where all factories would be put under workers' control, and absolute freedom of writing would be assured by every worker being given the automatic right of access to paper and printing works to publish what he chose. The book was kept in print, and from time to time it must have had on disciplined Communists the effect that re-reading open-eyed the Sermon on the Mount sometimes has upon a satisfied cleric.

But Lenin had added, as indeed anyone would have had to add in 1917 when bandit chiefs and pseudo-Tsars were roaming the country supported by western States, that this desirable state could only be achieved by a most relentless, disciplined, prolonged effort. Even apart from Marxist theory it would have been clear that no force other than that of the town workers could in Russia have provided this effort. The noble and imperial classes which had ruined the country were defeated and in flight, the bourgeois middle class was small, feeble and politically so unrealistic that until a few weeks before the revolution it had been talking of conquering Constantinople; the peasants were unlettered dark people who could do no more than follow the leadership of the towns. The workers must, therefore, take a temporary dictatorship and lead all other classes; through their Soviets they were doing so. But there were working class leaders, or those who called themselves such, who were prepared to suggest compromise and weakness in the struggle. They must be eliminated. Only the class-conscious workers, that was to say, must exercise the dictatorship. How, then, should a practical politician recognize class-conscious workers? Clearly, by the fact that they followed the Communist Party's lead. Even before Lenin died, the Soviets had, in consequence of this reasoning, begun to be formal bodies only; all decisions were taken within the Communist Party.

After this, in the twenties, it was a short step, but a fatal one, for disagreement within the Communist Party to be treated as being equally as treacherous as disagreement from without. A nucleus of chiefs then became all-powerful; within that nucleus the least scrupulous man, Stalin, who had the key position of Party Secretary, by the usual methods was able to make himself master. There was nothing new here in human history; what was new was that during this process the revolutionary formulas had to be unchanged. Stalin's rivals, or potential rivals, before they were executed, had therefore to be charged with (or even better, admit) conspiring with Fascism, Nazism, American Im-

perialism, or whatever might seem most suitable, to destroy the revolution. Originally, as in the trial (in his absence) of Trotsky, efforts were made to make the evidence seem plausible, and Soviet propagandists were discomposed when it was found that a guilty plot had been located at a Copenhagen hotel that had long ceased to exist. But as the years passed, the confessions became as standardized as a medieval confession of witchcraft or heresy; police chiefs who had been the most merciless in carrying out Stalin's terror were reported as confessing that they had done so as paid spies of the West, and revolutionaries with twenty years of prison and torture behind them announced that it had all been a colossal deception act put on for payments in francs or pounds.

That these fantastic stories could be accepted was in part due to the complete separation from the rest of the world which the Soviet leaders were able to enforce on their people. No books or newspapers were published except those run by Communists. Importation of foreign papers and books was forbidden. Broadcasts from abroad were jammed steadily from 1946 onwards. No travellers were admitted except carefully selected admirers. No travelling abroad was permitted at all, except for a very few officials. History was re-written; inventions from flying to wireless were ascribed to Russians; even the story of the revolution was altered so that Stalin played an enormously preponderant part. The Old Bolsheviks who had known the free world were terrorized or dead; in any case they were very few, and their successors like Gromyko or Malik were well-trained bureaucrats who had lived and risen in Stalin's shadow. It would be unfair to call them "hypocritical" as Western commentators often did when they saw murder, tyranny and conquest described as peace, freedom and democracy. The most enlightening analogy with the Stalinists is a religious one. The Spanish conquerors of Peru, according to Prescott, secured gold for themselves and slavery for others; their methods were perfidy and cruelty; yet all the time they believed their chief intention was to convert the heathen, and at the moment that they sent their victim to the pyre or the gallows they would hold a cross before his eyes, begging him with genuine tears in their eyes to recognize Christ the Lord. The Pizarros, indeed, were more sophisticated than the Russians; the historian records that they always personally attended funeral services for their enemies in Lima cathedral, clothed in the deepest black.

The reasoning by which Stalinists justified their actions to themselves was rather more complex but ultimately similar.

As they were not abandoned when the leader was discredited, they deserve analysis. In Marxist philosophy, bourgeois society must by its nature consistently fight the working class (by which it will be vanquished in the end). Therefore, any pacts or treaties signed by a bourgeois state with the class-conscious workers' state must be fundamentally dishonest. The only question was: "When should they be broken?" and obviously the honest Communist answer would be, "At the time most convenient for the working class". Any self-styled leaders of the workers who did not accept Communist direction were, by the formula also, traitors or potential traitors; therefore any coalition with them must end either in their absorption or their elimination. It would not be good sense to wait for their treachery to show itself (nor even fair to the workers); they should be eliminated at the earliest moment that was prudent, even before they had in fact offended; and evidence might have to be fabricated in that latter case. Furthermore, all capitalist powers were by their inner contradictions forced towards imperialist war. Peace campaigns must thus have as their objectives the weakening of all non-Communist forces, and the disruption of all non-Communist alliances. Communist armies must not be discussed.

This propaganda, not unnaturally denounced as double-faced, was the staple of many plausibly named organizations operating from 1945 onwards, to which the alert politician had to have a sort of annotated directory. There is no need to reproduce the list (the bodies were as ephemeral as they were deceptive) but it should be noted that this campaign was most successful in the trade union world. There was founded late in the war a "World Trade Union International" with an English Chairman but a Communist Secretary, which rapidly became an instrument of Communism. Since, commonly enough, only one in ten of trade unionists troubles to vote in union elections, Communists also secured control in many single unions and in the trade union centres of France and Italy. They failed to follow this up, even in these two countries, by a political victory, largely because of the ruthless and much criticized actions of M. Moch and Signor Scelba, who cleared out Communists and "fellow travellers" from the police and judiciary in France and Italy.

Soviet records are of course not open for inspection, but later events indicate that it was in 1948 that a decision was taken to abandon any attempt to carry out agreements with the West, and to pass over to direct aggression wherever this could be achieved without causing a world war. In Asia this new policy was adopted immediately after the 1948 congress in Calcutta of

"Young Communists", which probably had a much wider importance than that name suggests. The chief insurrections supported and organized by the Communists in consequence were the war in North Vietnam, already described, the guerrilla war of the largely peasant "Hukbalahaps" in the Philippines and the similar guerrilla war in the Federated Malay States, both of which lasted years and caused much bloodshed; less damage was done by the Communist violence in Hyderabad and Andhra in India. In Europe, the new policy was most dramatically shown by the Berlin blockade. Having broken up the quadruple Allied administration of the city, and retired to their own eastern section, the Russians (who occupied the territory surrounding the city under the armistice arrangements) began in June to cut the Allied sector off. At first some trivial pretence was made of a breakdown in communications, but by July all pretence was abandoned and a total blockade enforced of the Allies and the Berliners who depended on them. This was only one of many breaches of agreements by the Russians, but it was the most dramatic and the most directly hostile. There must have been a period of great danger, but the crisis passed without war, for the Allies, headed by the United States and Great Britain, broke the Russian blockade by the expensive method of supplying both their garrisons and the population of Western Berlin by air; the "air-lift" lasted a year before the Russians accepted defeat and abandoned their blockade.

Meanwhile, they had added to their empire a whole series of European states. They had already retained, and planted with Russian settlements, the Baltic States of Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia which they had taken over in the days of their alliance with the Nazis in 1940. But the states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been freed from the Germans by the war and their right to independence and free institutions was specifically guaranteed by agreements with the West. In the year 1948, despite Western protests, the freedom and independence of all these countries but one was extinguished and they were made Russian satellites, with a Communist social structure. (An attempt was made to include Greece in the victims, by invasion from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but the invaders were defeated in January in an attempt to take Konitza in Epirus.) The one exception to the list of enslaved states was the one where the Russians had made the mistake of not stationing a garrison—Yugoslavia. Their attempt to gain control of the security forces and the economic development of Yugoslavia was frustrated by an unexpected

and almost unanimous resistance by Tito and the Yugoslav Communists—a resistance partly motivated by the Yugoslav adherence to the primitive and uncorrupted Communism of Lenin's day, of which Stalin's régime seemed to them a degenerate parody. But elsewhere "the lights went out", as they had done a decade earlier under Fascism. Czechoslovakia was the earliest to go. It was a democracy, but it ceased to be in February 1948. The non-Communist members of the Cabinet in that month resigned in an attempt to stop the "communization" of the police force; Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, came to Prague; the President, Dr. Benes, appointed a Communist ministry. In March Masaryk the Foreign Minister, the only independent figure left in the Government, committed suicide or was killed; in June the President gave up his place to a Communist named Gottwald; in September he died. All was over. In Rumania King Michael was openly forced to abdicate; a "Rumanian Workers' Party" was established in February which took over the complete administration of the country after an election in which it arranged to secure 405 out of 413 seats. In Hungary the process of destroying the power of the Smallholders' Party and replacing it by a Communist dictatorship was slower; it was "the salami process, slice by slice" in the phrase of Rakosi, who with the Secretary Rajk, was its chief practitioner. By the end of 1948 it was completed, and marked dramatically by the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Roman Catholic church in Hungary. In Bulgaria the process began in 1947; Nicholas Petkov the leader of the Agrarian party which represented the chief opposition to the Communists was executed in August of that year, it being officially stated that the extreme penalty had been inflicted because Britain and America had intervened on his behalf. Albania presented no difficulties, but the absorption of Poland was naturally (in view of her past) somewhat slower. There was an enforced fusion of the Socialist and Communist parties this year, giving control to the latter, but it was not until November 1949 that the final step was taken by the appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Russian Marshal Rokossovsky, the same commander who had held back the Russian armies in 1944 until the Warsaw revolt had been crushed.

By that date—1949—a further step had been taken in subduing these territories; many of the chief instruments in their subjection were themselves imprisoned or executed, for reasons which must still be the subject of speculation. Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria and Xoxe in Albania were among those

killed; Gomulka in Poland and Mrs. Pauker in Rumania were more fortunate in escaping with their lives. The suggestion that these events carried of a growing autocracy was reinforced by events inside Russia, such as the compelling (February 1948) of the chief Russian musicians, Shostakovitch, Prokofiev, Khatchaturian and others, to confess to the crime of "losing touch with the masses" by writing the wrong kind of music, and the endorsement (August 1948) of the "Michurinist" theories of mutation by environment advanced by the academician Lysenko. By this decision, the Communist party declared the Mendelian theory of heredity a false theory punishable by dismissal; it was known as "Mendelist-Morganist-Weissmanism". From these years also dates the great growth of concentration camps, or rather concentration-cities, of which the most famous was Vorkuta in the Arctic circle; in them convicts working under abominable conditions were used to hasten the industrialization of the Soviet Union. These slave armies were under the control of the political police; how many they numbered is uncertain, but they ran into several millions, and were an important element in Soviet economy.

In 1949 there was a further great expansion of Communist power. The conflict between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuo-min-tang forces had not brought the latter the success he had expected. In January 1949 the Communists captured Peking, and Chiang's forces began to dissolve. Though they received lavish aid from the Americans, the Kuo-min-tang armies declined to fight the Communists, whom they seemed in fact to prefer to their corrupt and incompetent leaders. By mid-December Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee to the island of Formosa, having lost a larger empire more quickly than any other ruler in history.

§ 4

The Western Resistance.

During this period the Western nations had been in great danger; the Russians had kept up their immense military strength, while the West had demobilized and become partially disarmed. At one time there was scarcely anything but the American possession of atom bombs which stood between Western Europe and Soviet conquest—a conquest which would have spread

rapidly to Asia and Africa. Now the American bomb monopoly had disappeared. The urgency of the danger compelled the non-Communist powers into an alliance, drafted in March 1949 and brought into force in September, called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which proved to be an effective (indeed, the only effective) barrier to further Soviet expansion westwards. The original members states were the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, Italy, Holland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark and Norway; to them were later allied Greece and Turkey. The most important clauses of the treaty set up combined armed forces of all powers concerned, to protect them from aggression. General Eisenhower, once the Supreme Allied Commander, was made its commander. Furthermore, a place was kept for Germany, when that state should be restored. A great step to that end was taken in September 1949 when the first German Cabinet was formed from what had been the American, English and French zones of occupation; the first Chancellor was Dr. Adenauer. The recovery of the wrecked country under his direction was phenomenal, and contrasted happily with the misery of the "German Peoples' Democratic Republic" set up in the Russian zone.

Direct conflict with the Communists in their role of new imperialists was to come, however, not in the West but the East. On the refusal of the United Nations (January 1950) to accept the Chinese Communists in the place of Chiang Kai-shek's delegates, the Russians and their satellites had begun to boycott the organization, a mistake in tactics which was to give an opportunity to their opponents. The Russians had occupied under armistice terms the half of Korea north of the 38th parallel, the Americans the southern half; the Americans under United Nations' instructions had set up a formally democratic state (actually dominated by an autocratic President, Syngman Rhee), but the Russians had prevented United Nations representatives entering the northern half and had set up the usual Communist dictatorship. In June 1950 the North Korean armies invaded South Korea; it was immediately clear that they had been equipped by their Communist allies with all the munitions of modern war, and the South Koreans, who possessed little more than an armed police, quite unprepared for such warfare, stood no chance. Owing to the Russian absence, the Security Council of the United Nations was able within two days to resolve to come to the aid of South Korea; the aggression was so flagrant that 48 countries supported the Council's decision to authorize the raising of an army, to be led by the United States, who alone had any forces of importance

in the region. Even India and Sweden sent medical units to the United Nations army.

The opening battles of the war went in favour of the North Koreans; the reinforcements to the South Koreans were "green" and outnumbered, and for a while were pinned into a corner of the peninsula. But a masterly outflanking landing at Inchon by General MacArthur broke the offensive power of the North Koreans, who were soon running in defeat. In September the United Nations forces reoccupied Seoul, the capital, and crossed the 38th parallel in pursuit of the invaders; next month the troops of the now-Communist Chinese Republic invaded North Korea, and pushed the United Nations troops back roughly to the 38th parallel. A grinding and indecisive war followed. The Russians had resumed their place on the United Nations Security Council and vetoed any further activity, though they were unable of course to repeal the decisions already taken. The United Nations Assembly in February 1952 voted China guilty of aggression by 44 votes to 7, but no action could follow this resolution.

Nor was there any evidence of less bellicosity on the Communist side. Negotiations for an armistice were opened in July 1951, but their course showed that the Communists did not wish them to succeed. At the United Nations meeting in November, Vyshinsky, the Soviet delegate, announced that he had laughed "so hard that he could not sleep" at Western proposals for disarmament—the only proposals that he thought could be entertained were for the United Nations troops to leave Korea and Nato to be outlawed. The Chinese Communists subjected their prisoners to "brainwashing", a systematic process of ill-treatment and indoctrination intended to break their morale down and turn them into convinced Communists; they also put out propaganda saying that the United Nations planes were dropping germs upon them.

How far this approach to general war might have gone it is impossible to say. It was interrupted by the death of one man. Stalin's autocracy had grown more oppressive and less rational; after having been responsible for the enforcement of Lysenko's biological theories he had, in 1950, become a philological authority, condemning Marr's theories of language. He had encouraged a revival of what seemed to be anti-Semitism, he had capriciously eliminated officials who had risen to importance, even banishing Molotov's wife (herself a minister in her own right) to Siberia, and finally (as with more ancient autocrats) he had discovered conspiracies among his doctors. In March 1953 he died suddenly, and (for many of his colleagues) very conveniently. An attempt

by Beria, the chief of police, to take his place a short while later was defeated; Beria was shot and it was announced (in the usual formula) that he was an imperialist spy.

Stalin's disappearance did not make so immediate a difference as did the death of, say, Ivan the Terrible. But it led to relaxations which were gratefully received. The armistice negotiations in Korea were brusquely concluded and the war ended. The doctors were released and their accusers punished. The "cult of a personality" was officially condemned and for a short while the conduct of Russian affairs appeared to be in the hands of a committee, not an individual. Life in the concentration-cities became easier, and gradually (as economic good sense had indicated for a long time) slave labour was diminished and made no longer a major factor of Soviet life. Criticism was permitted in literature and drama, though not in the Press and not of the Party, of politicians, or of political programmes. The more grandiose schemes of building and investment were abandoned, and more attention and materials given to the production of consumer goods. But this "thaw", as it was called, was limited both in area, and in time. In June 1953 the East German workers rebelled against their "peoples' government"; they were put down by Russian tanks. Nor, inside Russia, was it long before the influence of Malenkov, who appeared at first to be Stalin's heir and was supposed to be responsible for most of the economic relaxations, was seen to be in decline as compared with that of Bulganin and Khrushchev.


§ 5

A Diary of Recent Years.


Subsequent events are too near to us in time for a considered history to be written yet. The entries in this section, therefore, have to be in what is more like diary form.

In 1955 Malenkov was pushed out of power in Russia and given a minor ministerial post; Khrushchev and Bulganin became the chief Russian spokesmen, visiting Yugoslavia, India and Southern Asia on "goodwill" missions which had great success. Chou En-lai, Chinese Foreign Minister, attended at Bandung a conference of Asiatic powers, at which he abjured the use of force in international affairs and had an even greater success. British influence secured the signing of the "Bagdad pact" by Britain, Irak, Turkey, Persia and Pakistan, to erect a Near Eastern barrier against Communism. France granted freedom to Morocco.

In 1956 the Sudan became an independent republic, but the British government which agreed to this nevertheless embroiled itself in Cyprus, deporting to the Seychelles Archbishop Makarios,




the spokesman of the Greek Cypriots, the majority, who demanded union with Greece. Tunisia was granted independence by France, but an attempt by M. Mollet to proceed to concessions in Algeria was prevented by rioting by the French settlers, leading to the intensification of a dangerous guerrilla war. But more important



Remaining colonial possessions shaded

STATES of SOUTHERN ASIA 1959

seemed to be the results of the Russian "thaw". Khrushchev in February delivered to the 22nd congress of the Soviet Union Communist party a speech in which he described the criminality of Stalin's later life, and the falsity of the claims made for him; the exposure caused convulsive agitation in the hall and not less



convulsive disturbances elsewhere. For a while it seemed as though genuine frankness and some amount of liberty might return to the Communist world; several "minor Stalins" lost their posts. In two satellite states the repercussions were profound. In Poland the disgraced leader Gomulka was first pardoned, and then restored to power. Personal liberty, religious liberty and freedom of the Press were partially restored, and many of the more oppressive economic measures (especially those for

enforced collectivization of the land) were repealed. An attempt by Russian Communist leaders to intervene was successfully resisted, and Russian generals, headed by Rokossovsky, were politely removed from the Army. But Hungary was less fortunate. A like agitation led to the removal of the local dictator, Rakosi, and after various twistings to a coalition government under the Communist Imre Nagy. Similar but more drastic advances to personal political and religious freedom were made, and similar dissolutions of collective farms occurred. But an insistent demand, enforced by strikes, was made for the evacuation of Hungary by Russian troops. The Russians seemed to hesitate—indeed, may in fact have done so—and made detailed promises to the Hungarians. But under the cover of these they were massing troops to crush the country, and in November Hungarian revolution with massive slaughter. No assistance to the Hungarians, despite appeals, came from the West.

The West was indeed deeply divided by an unexpected action by Britain and France. Nasser, the Egyptian general who had taken the place of King Farouk after an internal revolution, had nationalized the Suez Canal when America and Britain had abruptly cancelled a promise to finance for him a high dam on the Nile. This had greatly annoyed the British government, and relations were bad. Late in October, under incessant provocation, Israel attacked Egypt in Sinai. The Egyptian troops were badly beaten, and the Israelis were approaching the Suez Canal, when France and Britain announced that unless both sides withdrew twelve miles from the Canal they would seize it themselves. When the Egyptians refused, the two powers attacked Egypt, bombing its airfields and after a week's delay invading the Suez Canal region. This was a breach of the Charter of the United Nations, and met with strong disapproval of the vast majority of the nations, including many members of the British Commonwealth. The two nations had not even secured control of the Canal before they were compelled by United Nations action first to halt and then to evacuate. By the end of December all their troops had gone, having secured nothing and having destroyed British influence and reputation in the Middle East.

Early in 1957 traffic through the Suez Canal was restored. American "stratojets" flew round the world in a non-stop flight. The Russians sent up into space a small artificial satellite, called the "sputnik". Molotov, Kaganovitch, Malenkov and other possible rivals to Khrushchev were expelled from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party.

In 1958 Bulganin was degraded and Khrushchev became the unquestioned leader of Russia. Egypt and Syria united under Nasser as the "United Arab Republic"; the King of Irak was murdered with his Prime Minister Nuri es-Said, and Irak was no longer a "pro-Western" country. The French settlers in Algiers, with the aid of many local officers, staged what came near to being a revolt; stability was only restored by the election of de Gaulle as Prime Minister, with the promise of a new Constitution. All French possessions abroad, except Guinea, voted to remain with France under this Constitution.

In 1959 a provisional settlement was reached in Cyprus; in Cuba Fidel Castro, a bearded young leader whose rebellion had passed almost unnoticed, drove out President Batista; hopes of a more civilized régime were shaken by the large numbers of executions which followed. International tension was raised to acuteness by a threat from Khrushchev to sign a treaty with the East German republic and put an end to the freedom of West Berlin; but it was sharply reduced after a visit by him to President Eisenhower, where it was agreed to press forward to a summit meeting next year of the heads of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain and France. Great hopes, which were to prove vain, were formed of a permanent *détente* in consequence. (

In 1960 Khrushchev took advantage of the shooting down over Russia of the American espionage aeroplane U2 to break up the "Summit" conference in Geneva before it could transact any business, and international relations became as tense as before. There was, however, a great extension of freedom in Africa; among the colonies which became independent states were Nigeria, Somaliland, Togoland, Madagascar, Mali, Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey, the upper Volta and Mauritania. The Belgians left the Belgian Congo precipitately at the end of May; within a week the sole guardian of public order, the "Force Publique", had mutinied and there was chaos. One province, Katanga, declared itself independent. United Nations troops were called for to restore order, and came; but owing to the lack of support, especially from the Russians, they could do little but prevent total collapse and open civil war. In Laos, a small state between Siam and Indo-China, a potentially dangerous civil war broke out between Communists and non-Communists.